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SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE-
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: WHAT FACTORS
CONSTITUTE GOOD CAUSE ATTRIBUTABLE TO
THE EMPLOYER WHEN AN EMPLOYEE
LEAVES EMPLOYMENT VOLUNTARILY?
Newland v. Job Service North Dakota,
460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
Joy Newland was employed as a utility clerk and order filler
for one and one-half years by Dakota Drug, Inc., a wholesale com-
pany in Minot, North Dakota.' Newland's original work hours
were from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. 2 In January 1989, however, the
company informed Newland that her shift would change to an
irregular evening schedule with indefinite starting and ending
times. 3 Although the new schedule did not involve an increase or
decrease in hours, the time when Newland was to begin and end
work each day was unpredictable.4 Because Newland was unable
to secure child care during the hours encompassed by her new
work schedule, she quit her job and fied a claim for unemploy-
ment benefits with Job Service North Dakota.' Job Service denied
benefits after determining that Newland quit her job for personal
reasons that did not constitute "good cause attributable to her
employer," which is a prerequisite to being entitled to benefits.6
1. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118, 120 (N.D. 1990).
2. Id.
3. Id. Newland's new shift would be from at least 4:30 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. or later. Id.
The shift change became effective February 26, 1989. Id.
4. Id. The beginning and ending times of the new shift would be dependant upon the
amount of work to be done. Id.
5. Id. Newland's husband was employed on an evening shift and was therefore not
available during that time to care for the couple's three children. Id. Upon being notified
of the shift change, Joy Newland attempted to arrange for evening child care. Brief for
Appellant at 1, Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990) (No. 890348)
(available at the Thormodsgard Law Library) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. She was
unable to find any child care providers in the small town of Burlington, North Dakota who
would work evening hours. Id. Newland attempted to find other employment with both
her employer and other businesses but was unsuccessful. Id. at 2.
North Dakota Century Code § 52-06-01 provides the required conditions for an
unemployed individual to be eligible to receive benefits. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-01
(1989). Generally, § 52-06-01 requires that the individual: (1) make a claim for benefits; (2)
register for work at, and continue to report to an unemployment office; (3) be able to work,
be available for suitable work and be actively seeking work; and (4) to have been
unemployed for a waiting period of one week. Id.
6. See Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120; N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02 (1989 & Supp. 1991)
(an individual is disqualified for benefits if he leaves employment voluntarily without "good
cause attributable to the employer"). For the text of § 52-06-02, see infra note 47. The
North Dakota Supreme Court has defined "attributable to the employer" to mean
produced, caused, created or as a result of actions by the employer. Newland, 460 N.W.2d
at 122.
In Newland's initial claim for unemployment benefits, the claims deputy allowed
benefits on a finding that, because of the shift change, she had established good cause
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The district court for Ward County, North Dakota, affirmed the
decision of Job Service.7 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme
Court reversed the district court and held that an employee's diffi-
culty in obtaining child care due to a change from standard work
hours to an on-call schedule with unpredictable hours may consti-
tute good cause attributable to the employer if the employee
makes a good faith effort to remain attached to the labor market.8
Unemployment compensation was introduced into the United
States on a national basis in 1935.' The system, known as the Fed-
eral Unemployment Tax Act,10 was a part of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's New Deal legislation and was incorporated into the
Internal Revenue Code." The purpose of the unemployment
compensation system during this era was twofold."2 First, the
money distributed through unemployment benefits was seen as a
means of preventing a "downward economic spiral.' 3 Second,
the benefits were viewed as a means of providing some protection
against the devastating impact of unemployment on the jobless
worker. 14
Today, the primary purpose of unemployment compensation
attributable to her employer for quitting. Brief for Appellee, supra note 5, at 1. Following
an appeal by her employer, Dakota Drug Co., a hearing was held. Id. The appeals referee
affirmed the deputy's determination. Id. The employer appealed to Job Service North
Dakota, which reversed the referee's decision on a finding that her reasons for leaving her
position were not attributable to her employer. Id. at 1-2. The appeal board of Job Service
North Dakota stated:
Although parental obligations no doubt constitute good personal reasons for
termination of employment, they lack the objective nexus with employment so
as to constitute good cause attributable to the employer. It must be concluded
that the claimant voluntarily left [her] most recent employment without good
cause attributable to the employer.
Job Service North Dakota, Decision on Review, (No. JS 89-06) (May 2, 1989) (emphasis
added).
7. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., No. 59222 at 36 (D. Ct. N.D. Aug. 2, 1989). The district
court, in affirming Job Service's decision, noted that the language of North Dakota Century
Code § 52-06-02, is unambiguous. Id. For the text of § 52-06-02 see infra note 47. The
court held that the statute could not be construed to allow unemployment compensation
benefits to an employee who voluntarily leaves her job because of personal parental
obligations. Id. Newland appealed the decision to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120.
8. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 120.
9. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 301(1950)). Wisconsin, the only state with an unemployment compensation statute prior to the
Social Security Act of 1935, adopted this social insurance measure in 1932. Eveline M.
Bums, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1, 1
(1945).
10. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1988). The Federal Unemployment Tax Act is chapter 23 of
U.S.C. Title 26. 26 U.S.C. § 23 (1988).
11. MATTHEW E. MADDEN, EMPLOYER'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION 1 (1979).
12. Burns, supra note 9, at 12.
13. Id.
14. See id.
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is the same as it was during the New Deal era-to provide a "par-
tial replacement of lost wages" to those persons who are jobless
"through no fault of their own.' 5  Currently, every state has an
unemployment insurance system to provide benefits to unem-
ployed workers.' 6
Unemployment is a problem that creates serious social bur-
dens and leads to economic insecurity. 17 The unemployment com-
pensation system provides security by encouraging employers to
provide more stable employment and to systematically accumu-
late funds during periods of employment in order to provide bene-
fits to employees during periods of unemployment.'
While these unemployment systems give security to the
unemployed worker, unemployment compensation statutes
"'embody the philosophy that compensation should be given only
to those who are unemployed by virtue of some involuntary cir-
cumstance."' 9 A problem arises, however, when economic rea-
sons or family commitments force an employee to terminate his or
her employment.2 0 While these decisions to quit may be due to
15. Peter S. Saucier & John A. Roberts, Unemployment Compensation: A Growing
Concern for Employers, 9 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 594, 594 (1984).
16. Id. In North Dakota, the legislature has recognized that involuntary
unemployment causes hardships for unemployed workers and, accordingly, has created an
unemployment insurance system for workers who are jobless through no fault of their own.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01 (1989 & Supp. 1991). North Dakota's statutory policy
provides:
Involuntary unemployment creates a hardship on the unemployed worker and
his [or her] family and leads to a state of economic insecurity. Relief from
problems of involuntary unemployment imposes a statewide burden of serious
consequence to the people of the state of North Dakota which can best be met
by unemployment insurance for the working man [or woman] who becomes
unemployed through no fault of his [or her] own. The legislative assembly,
therefore, declares that the public good and general welfare of the citizens of the
state requires that for laboring people genuinely attached to the labor market
there be a systematic and compulsory setting aside of financial reserves to be
used as compensation for loss of wages during periods when they become
unemployed through no fault of their own.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (1989).
17. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D. 1990) (quoting N.D. CENT.
CODE § 52-01-05 (1989)).
18. See MADDEN, supra note 11, at 2. See generally 76 AM. Jul. 2D, Unemployment
Compensation § 5 (1975 & Supp. 1991) (discusses purposes of unemployment compensation
statutes).
19. Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Eligibility For Unemployment Compensation As
Affected by Voluntary Resignation Because of Change of Location of Residence, 21 A.L.R.
4th 317 (1983) (emphasis added).
20. See Snyder v. Commonwealth, Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 387
A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978) (the claimant who refused shift change assignment
because of inability to secure care for her daughter voluntarily terminated employment as
to be ineligible for unemployment compensation); Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell
Regulator Co., 61 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. 1953) (holding the claimant unavailable for work
and not qualified for unemployment benefits because she was unable to find early morning
child care for her children).
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necessity, they are generally still considered voluntary.2 1 An
example is the case of an employee who quits her job because her
employer has changed her hours from a day shift to a second or
third shift position, and she is unable to make child care arrange-
ments during the later shift.2 In some states, to terminate one's
employment under these particular circumstances is not consid-
ered to be involuntary, and therefore, the employee is disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits.2 3
In Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc.,24 an Indiana appellate court
focused on the issue of whether parental obligations and shift
changes constituted the work-connected "good cause" require-
ment.25  In Gray, the claimant was employed as a cook and ini-
tially worked a 6:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. day shift.26 With minimal
notice, the claimant's employer assigned her to a 2:30 p.m. to
10:30 p.m. swing shift.27 The claimant made an effort to work the
new shift, but because of compelling child care obligations and dif-
ficulties with transportation, the claimant quit her job.2 ' The
claimant argued that child care obligations and transportation diffi-
culties constituted "good cause" within the meaning of Indiana
law, and consequently, she was not required to show "good cause
in connection with the employer" for quitting her job.29 The
21. Lyons v. Appeal Bd. of the Mich. Employment See. Comm'n, 108 N.W.2d 849, 857
(Mich. 1961) (commuting expenses and family obligations prohibited continuation of
employment nearly 300 miles away); see Moya v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, 450 P.2d 925,
927 (N.M. 1969) (the claimant's responsibility to care for his grandmother during evening
shift did not make evening work unsuitable within meaning of statute).
22. Snyder, 387 A.2d at 518; see Swanson, 61 N.W.2d at 528.
23. See MADDEN, supra note 11, at 174-78 (listing applicable state disqualifications).
Under North Dakota law, unemployment benefits are withheld when the employee quits
voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer. N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-
06-02(1) (1989 & Supp. 1991).
24. 357 N.E.2d 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
25. Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). Indiana Code
§ 22-4-14-1 to 14-4 provide the required conditions for an unemployed individual to be
eligible to receive benefits. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-4-14-1 to 14-4 (Burns 1986 & Supp.
1991). Generally, §§ 22-4-14-1 to 14-4 require that the individual: (1) make a claim for
benefits; (2) register for work at an unemployment office; (3) be able to work, be available
for work and be making an effort to secure work; and (4) to have been unemployed for a
waiting period of one week. Id. Indiana Code § 22-4-15-1 disqualifies an individual from
benefits if he voluntarily leaves his employment "without good cause in connection with the
work." IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-1 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). In
addition, § 22-4-15-2 disqualifies an individual from receiving benefits if he or she "fails
without good cause" to apply for or accept suitable work. IND. CODE ANN. § 22-4-15-2
(Burns 1986 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
26. Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 902. The claimant, who did not own a car, was able to car pool
with a fellow employee who worked the same shift. Id. She was also able to adequately
arrange day care for her children while working this shift. Id.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 903. In Gray, the Review Board determined that the claimant
had " 'possibly good personal reasons"' for quitting her job; however, those reasons were
not found to be "'good cause in connection with the work.'"' Id. at 902. See IND. CODE
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court noted, however, that the "good cause" requirement for
rejecting offered employment was not intended by the legislature
to have the same meaning as the "good cause in connection with
the work" requirement for voluntarily quitting a job.3" Accord-
ingly, the Gray court held that while parental obligations may con-
stitute "good cause" for refusal to accept work offered, such
obligations do not constitute "good cause in connection with the
work" for voluntarily quitting a job.3 '
A Florida District Court of Appeals, in Beard v. State,32 joined
the Gray court's position that voluntarily quitting employment
based on difficulties in obtaining child care does not constitute
"good cause attributable to [ones] employer. ' 33 The court noted
that while other jurisdictions have held that child care obligations
are "good cause" for refusing to accept employment, the "good
cause" standard in the statutes of those states did not include the
words "attributable to the employer" or "connected with the
employment.- 34 Although the court sympathized with the claim-
ANN. §§ 22-4-15-1, 22-4-15-2 (Bums 1986 & Supp. 1991). See also Hacker v. Review Bd.,
271 N.E.2d 191 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971). The Hacker court held that a woman involuntarily laid
off when the night shift had been discontinued was entitled to benefits, even though she
restricted the time she was available for work to the night shift. Id. at 195-97. The woman
had four children under ten years of age at home, could not find child care at other times,
registered each week for benefits, and made phone calls seeking employment. Id. at 196.
The Gray court distinguished this case by noting that in Hacker the woman was
involuntarily laid-off and was "available for work" despite her limited availability to the
night shift. Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 903-04.
30. Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 904. The Gray court stated that parental obligations were no
doubt good personal reasons for leaving a job, but they lacked the necessary nexus with
employment. Id. at 903.
31. Id. "Good cause in connection with the work" and "good cause attributable to the
employer" have essentially been defined by courts to have similar meanings. Compare
Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 903 (defines "good cause in connection with the work" as good cause
which must be "related to the employment") with Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d
118, 122 (N.D. 1990) (" 'attributable to the employer' means 'produced, caused, created or
as a result of actions by the employer' "') (quoting Couch v. North Carolina Emp. Sec.
Comm'n, 366 S.E.2d 574, 577 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988)).
The claimant also argued that her reason for quitting was '"in connection with the
work"' because the shift change was caused by the employer. Gray, 357 N.E.2d at 907.
The court found, however, that the claimant had voluntarily terminated her employment
because of domestic obligations and transportation problems and, therefore, refused to
address the shift change issue. Id. at 908.
32. 369 So. 2d 382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
33. Beard v. State, 369 So. 2d 382, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979). The claimant, a
correctional officer, was originally employed to work a 2:00 p.m. to midnight shift. Id. at
383. Seven months later she was assigned to an 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. shift. Id. With two
days notice, the claimant's employer notified her that she would be assigned to the 11:45
p.m. to 7:45 a.m. shift. Id. Because she was unable to secure nighttime supervision for her
children on such short notice, the claimant quit her job and filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits. Id. Benefits were denied by the Unemployment Board because her
resignation was not for "'good cause attributable to the employer."' Id.
For a discussion of claimants' refusal to work at certain times, see 76 AM. JuR. 2D
Unemployment Compensation § 72 (1975 & Supp. 1991).
34. Beard, 369 So. 2d at 384-85. E.g., Tung-Sol Elec., Inc. v. Board of Review, 114 A.2d
285 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955).
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ant's position, it held that the legislature's intent for adding the
phrase "attributable to the employer" to the good cause require-
ment for voluntary termination was to exclude domestic obliga-
tions, such as child care, from good cause for voluntary
termination of employment.35
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, courts have denied
unemployment benefits to claimants who voluntarily quit employ-
ment due to conflicting child care obligations, by finding that the
"good cause attributable to the employer" requirement has not
been satisfied. 6 In addition, the majority of jurisdictions appear
to hold that child care obligations do not constitute "good cause"
for refusing employment and that a claimant may not limit his or
her availability to a certain shift or period of time because of such
obligations. There are, however, a significant number of
authoritites which recognize that family reasons may be suffi-
ciently compelling to constitute good cause to limit work availabil-
ity and yet leave the claimant sufficiently attached to the job
market to retain eligibility for unemployment compensation
benefits.38
35. Beard, 369 So. 2d at 385. A similar position was taken by the Iowa Supreme Court
in Pohlman v. Ertl Co., 374 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1985). The Pohlman court held that a
claimant's difficulties in obtaining child care during an available shift did not constitute
"good cause" to turn down a position. Pohlman, 374 N.W.2d at 256. Although the court
rejected the claimant's difficulties in obtaining child care as constituting "good cause" to
reject employment for the shift in question, the Iowa court did acknowledge that all child
care cases could not be treated the same. Id. at 255. Realizing that the needs and demands
of children and the particular circumstances of their parent's jobs will be greatly varied
from case to case, the court noted that it would be impossible to create black letter rules
that could apply in all cases. Id. The court explained further that in analyzing whether a
claimant's rejection of employment for child care reasons constitutes "good cause," each
case must be decided on its own merits. Id. Compare Yordmales v. Florida Indus. Comm'n,
158 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 1963) (holding that parent's refusal to work rotating hours was justified
because of delinquency problems with children) with Sonterre v. Job Serv. N.D., 379
N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1985) (holding that because there was no showing of any effort to secure
child care, refusal of employment on child care grounds was not justified).
36. E.g., Snyder v. Commonwealth, 387 A.2d 517, 519 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978); Gray v.
Dobbs House, Inc. 357 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976); Beard v. State, 369 So. 2d 382,
385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
37. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Appeal Bd. of Mich. Unemployment Compensation
Comm'n, 25 N.W.2d 586 (Mich. 1947). In Ford Motor Co. the Michigan Supreme Court
analyzed the problem of an employee refusing employment due to family and child care
obligations. Id. at 587. The claimant was employed by Ford Motor Co. as a bench hand on
the afternoon shift and was laid off after one and one-half years of employment. Id. at 586.
Several months after the claimant's lay-off she was recalled to work. Id. During the period
of the lay-off, the claimant informed the unemployment compensation claims examiner that
because of child care obligations, she was only available for the afternoon shift. Id. at 587.
Focusing on statutory eligibility requirements, the Ford Motor Co. court held that a
claimant who restricted her work hours to the afternoon shift in order to care for her
children in the morning was not "available for work" as required by Michigan law and,
consequently, was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 589.
38. E.g., Tung-Sol Elec., Inc. v. Board of Review, 114 A.2d 285, 288 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1955); Yordmalis v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 158 So. 2d 791, 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); Hacker v. Review Bd., 271 N.E.2d 191, 196-97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971); In re
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For example, in In re Watson,39 the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether refusal to work during a par-
ticular shift because of the inability to obtain child care disqualifies
a claimant for unemployment benefits.40 The court addressed the
distinction between the definition of "good cause" for refusal of
employment and "good cause attributable to the employer" for
voluntarily quitting employment. 4 1 If one voluntarily terminates
his employment, the court stated, his "good cause [must be] attrib-
utable to his employer," but if an unemployed person refuses to
accept suitable work when offered, his reason need only be "good
cause." 42 Thus, the court held that while the domestic obligations
of the claimant cannot qualify as "good cause attributable to the
employer," such obligations may qualify as "good cause" for
refusal to accept work.43
In Newland v. Job Service North Dakota,44 the North Dakota
Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an employee's diffi-
culty in finding adequate child care due to a shift change from
standard hours to an on-call schedule with unpredictable hours
constitutes good cause attributable to the employer for quitting, if
the employee makes a good faith effort to remain attached to the
labor market. 4- The North Dakota Supreme Court began by
Watson, 161 S.E.2d 1, 8-10 (N.C. 1968); see Ralph Altman & Virginia Lewis, Limited
Availability for Shift Employment: A Criterion of Eligibility for Unemployment
Compensation, 22 N.C. L. REV. 189 (1944); Louise F. Freeman, Able to Work and Available
for Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123, 129-30 (1945); Arthur M. Menard, Refusal of Suitable Work, 55
YALE L.J. 134, 147 (1945).
39. 161 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1968).
40. In re Watson, 161 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 1968). In Watson, a mother was laid off from the
first shift and six weeks later was offered employment by the same employer on the second
shift. Id. at 4. She refused to work on the second shift because she could not find suitable
nighttime care for her son. Id. Her claim for unemployment benefits was denied when the
examiner determined that her refusal to accept suitable employment was without good
cause. Id.
41. Id. at 7. General Statutes of North Carolina § 96-14(1) disqualifies an individual for
benefits if he leaves work without good cause attributable to the employer. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 96-14(1) (1991). In addition, § 96-14(3) disqualifies an individual from receiving
benefits if he fails without good cause to either apply for available suitable work or accept
suitable work that is offered to him. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(3) (1991). In Watson, the
court noted that North Carolina's law concerning qualification for benefits provided that
voluntary termination without "good cause attributable to the employer" disqualifies a
claimant from receiving benefits. Watson, 161 S.E.2d at 7. Similarily, the Watson court
held that the refusal to accept suitable employment without "good cause" constituted a
similar disqualification. Id. North Dakota has similar statutes. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 52-06-02(1Xa) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (disqualifies an individual for benefits if he left his most
recent employment "without good cause attributable to the employer"); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 52-06-02(3) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (disqualifies an individual if he fails "without good cause"
to apply for or accept suitable employment).
42. Watson, 161 S.E.2d at 7.
43. Id.
44. 460 N.W.2d 118 (N.D. 1990).
45. Newland v. Job Serv. N.D., 460 N.W.2d 118, 120 (N.D. 1990). On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court reviewed Job Service's decision to determine whether the decision
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examining the North Dakota Unemployment Compensation
Law.4 6 The court focused initially on sections 52-01-05 and 52-06-
02 of the North Dakota Century Code.47 The court commented
that North Dakota's public policy reason for such a social insurance
program, as provided in section 52-01-05, is to alleviate the finan-
cial hardship of a worker facing involuntary unemployment.48
The court noted further that under this statute, a worker is enti-
tled to receive unemployment compensation benefits when the
worker demonstrates a genuine commitment to being employed
and becomes unemployed through no fault of his or her own.49
The court qualified the scope of the public policy reasons by
noting that section 52-06-02 places limitations on the availability of
unemployment benefits., ° Under this statute, the court noted, an
employer does not bear the responsibility of providing benefits to
an employee who leaves for reasons unconnected to the
employer.5 '
Because both statutes were related to the same subject mat-
ter, the court believed that the intent of the legislature would be
best served by harmonizing them, if possible.52 While recognizing
was in accordance with applicable state law. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1991).
See also Erovick v. Job Serv. N.D., 409 N.W.2d 629, 630 (N.D. 1987) (supreme court looks to
the record compiled by the agency and the decision made by the agency, and not to the
decision of the district court when reviewing the administrative agency decision). For a
brief discussion of the agency's decision, see supra note 5.
46. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (North Dakota Social Security
statute).
47. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 52-01-05, 52-02-06 (1989 &
Supp. 1991). For the text of § 52-01-05, see supra note 16. Section 52-02-06, provides, in
pertinent part:
An individual is disqualified for benefits:
1. For the week in which he has left his most recent employment
voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer, and
thereafter until such time as he:
a. Can demonstrate that he has earned remuneration for personal
services in employment equivalent to at least eight times his weekly
benefit amount as determined under section 52-06-04; and
b. Has not left his most recent employment under disqualifying
circumstances.
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 52-06-02(lXa)(b) (1989 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
48. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. For the text of § 52-01-05, see supra note 16.
49. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. See Perske v. Job Serv. N.D., 336 N.W.2d 146, 148
(N.D. 1983).
50. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-06-02 (1989 & Supp.
1991). For the relevant text of this statute, see supra note 47.
51. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. See Lord v. Job Serv. N.D., 343 N.W.2d 92, 95-96
(N.D. 1984) (holding that employee's medical reasons for leaving a job were a result of
working conditions and not his diabetic condition and thus was good cause attributable to
the employer).
52. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121. The North Dakota court attempted to reconcile
these two statutes by using the criteria it had previously adopted in Dickinson Pub. Sch.
Dist. No. 1 v. Scott, 252 N.W.2d 216 (N.D. 1977). Id. The Scott court determined that
statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together so as to
1992] CASE COMMENT 233
that the legislature's intent in enacting section 52-01-05 was to
provide unemployment compensation to the worker who is sin-
cere in his or her commitment to working, the court also believed
that the legislature's intent with respect to section 52-06-02 was to
protect employers whose employees quit for reasons not attributa-
ble to the employer or employment.53 Noting the similarity of the
statutes, the court concluded that the legislature intended to strike
a balance between the goals of the statutes, and that both Job Ser-
vice and the courts must take this balance into consideration when
determining eligibility for benefits. 54 The court then concluded
that, given the remedial purpose of unemployment compensation
laws to alleviate the financial impact of unemployment on the
worker, the balance should be weighted in the employee's favor. 5
Looking to public policy reasons supporting the unemployment
compensation system, namely, that benefits should be provided to
persons unemployed through no fault of their own, the court con-
strued the provisions of section 52-01-05 in the worker's favor.
56
Next, the Newland court addressed the issue of whether New-
land's reasons for quitting her job were sufficient to warrant unem-
ployment benefits.57 Newland gave three reasons for quitting her
job: "(1) a substantial change in work hours; (2) the unavailability
of child care in her community after 7:00 p.m.; and (3) the prohibi-
tive cost of child care."5  The court emphasized that the adminis-
harmonize them, if possible, to give full force and effect to legislative intent. Id. (citing
Dickinson Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Scott, 252 N.W.2d 216, 219 (N.D. 1977).
53. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 121.
54. Id.
55. Id. See, e.g., Holman v. Olsten Corp., 389 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986);
McClain v. State Dept. of Indus. Rel., 405 So. 2d 34 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Osterhout v.
Everett, 639 S.W.2d 539 (Ark. 1982). The court also considered older North Dakota case
law which affirmed the position that a remedial statute must be liberally construed in favor
of the purposes for which the statute was intended. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122 (citing
Smith v. Huff, 127 N.W. 1047 (N.D. 1910)).
56. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (1989).
57. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. Although the North Dakota Supreme Court
enumerated three reasons for Newland's decision to terminate her employment, Newland's
application for benefits listed only two reasons for terminating her employment: (1)
unavailablity of evening child care; and (2) prohibitive cost of evening child care for her
three children. Brief for Appellant, supra note 5, at 4. Regarding Newland's reason for
quitting due to the prohibitive cost of child care, the court acknowledged that Job Service
was justified in denying this as a valid reason for quitting. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. See
Sonterre v. Job Serv. N.D., 379 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1985) (parental obligations are not
attributable to the employer). See also Lyell v. Labor & Indus. Rel. Comm'n, 553 S.W.2d
899, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Gray v. Dobbs House, Inc., 357 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Ind. Ct. App.
1976); 81 C.J.S. Social Security § 230 (1977). The court noted that arranging for child care
in order to work is an employee's responsibility. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. See
generally Pohlman v. Ertl Co., 374 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Iowa 1985) (the claimant's difficulties
in child care arrangements for second shift position did not constitute "good cause" for
refusing employment).
58. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122.
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trative agency must consider all of the claimant's reasons for
quitting before making a determination.5 9 The court noted that
unemployment compensation law does not require the claimant to
base the decision to leave her employment on just one reason.60
Accordingly, the court took the apparently unprecedented posi-
tion that while child care alone may not "be a condition attributa-
ble to the employer, it may in combination with other factors
constitute good cause for quitting attributable to the employer."'"
Thus, Job Service is now required to consider all reasons that may
have combined to make a claimant quit employment.62
One reason given by Newland for quitting was the substantial
shift change implemented by her employer.63 Thus, the court
addressed the issue of whether quitting a job because of a shift
change constitutes good cause attributable to the employer.64 The
court noted that because a work schedule is produced, caused or
created by the employer, any schedule change must be considered
attributable to the employer.65 Job Service argued that a change
59. Id. The court relied on Taylor v. Iowa Dept. of Job Serv., 362 N.W.2d 534 (Iowa
1985), which indicated that if the agency has been adequately informed of an employee's
reasons for leaving employment, a claimant is entitled to have all reasons for quitting
considered. Taylor, 362 N.W.2d at 539.
60. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. Job Service argued that Sonterre v. Job Serv. N.D.,
379 N.W.2d 281 (N.D. 1985), should govern the court's decision in this case. Id.
In Sonterre, the court was presented with a case involving similar problems of shift
change and availability of child care. Sonterre, 379 N.W.2d at 284. Sonterre had been
working for approximately five years when her employer notified her that there would be a
change in hours from the 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. shift to the 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. shift and
every third weekend. Id. She notified her employer of the objections to the change and
requested that either her schedule remain the same or she be changed to the night shift.
Id. The issue before the court was whether the claimant voluntarily left employment with
good cause attributable to the employer. Id. Sonterre stated insufficient notice of the shift
change and inability to find child care as her reasons for quitting her job. Id.
The Newland court noted that in Sonterre, Job Service had considered all three of the
claimant's reasons for quitting but had determined that none of those reasons was
attributable to the employer. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. The Newland court also noted
that the claimant in Sonterre was given ample notice of the shift change in order to arrange
for child care, and therefore, her decision to quit was not for good cause attributable to the
employer. Id. The Newland court pointed out, however, that the language in Sonterre
would reasonably imply that if it was found that Sonterre's employer had given her an
unreasonable notice resulting in her inability to make child care arrangements, thereby
necessitating her decision to quit, her benefits may not have been denied. Id.
61. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122. The Newland court reiterated and adopted the
rationale of the Iowa Supreme Court, which held that in a claim where several reasons for
quitting are asserted, Job Service must use the following criteria: (1) "consider all reasons
which may have combined to give the claimant good cause to quit" and (2) "then consider
whether any of those reasons was a cause attributable to the employer." Id. (citing Taylor
v. Iowa Dept. of Job Serv., 362 N.W.2d 534, 541 (Iowa 1985)).
62. Id. The court noted that it is necessary for an employee to show a good faith effort
to remain employed and an inability to remain employed through no fault of her own. Id.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 52-01-05 (1989). The court defined fault to mean "failure to make
reasonable efforts to preserve one's employment." Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122.
63. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 122-23.
64. Id.
65. Id. See Couch v. North Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n, 366 S.E.2d 574, 577
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in one's shift does not constitute good cause attributable to the
employer unless the change involves a corresponding increase
in the number of hours worked.' The Newland court recognized
that "good cause [attributable to the employer]" had not been
defined previously by the North Dakota court and applied the fol-
lowing definition: "[I]n the context of unemployment compensa-
tion, 'good cause [attributable to the employer is]' a reason for
abandoning one's employment which would impel a reasonably
prudent person to do so under the same or similar
circumstances. "67
The court acknowledged that a shift change that results in an
increase in total hours constitutes good cause for quitting.68 The
court also stated that a decrease in hours and wages might give an
employee a good cause for leaving.69 The court noted, however,
that even if the number of hours worked does not change, a sub-
stantial shift change may constitute good cause attributable to the
employer. 70 The court stated further that if a shift change does
not create an increase in total hours worked, then such a change
must create a comparable burden to justify an employee's decision
to leave.7 '
Newland's shift change involved a change from a regular 8:00
a.m. to 4:30 p.m. shift to one that would require being on-call from
before 4:30 p.m. until after 8:30 p.m. 72  Considering the substanti-
ality of this change, the court determined it to be good cause
attributable to her employer for quitting, even though it resulted
in no increase or decrease in hours.7 3
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that "attributable to the employer" means "produced, caused,
created or as a result of actions by the employer").
66. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 123. See Montclair Nursing Center v. Wills, 371 N.W.2d
121, 125 (Neb. 1985) (an employer may change an employee's hours of employment,
provided the shift change is not done for some improper purpose). See also Markert v.
National Car Rental, 349 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Cafolla v. Unemployment
Compensation Bd. of Review, 362 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976).
67. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 123 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
68. Id. (citing Sonterre v. Job Serv. N.D., 379 N.W.2d 281, 284 (N.D. 1985)). See
generally 76 AM. JUR. 2D Unemployment Compensation § 59 (1975) (discusses voluntary
abandonment of employment).
69. Id. See, e.g., Tombigbee Lightweight Aggregate Corp. v. Roberts, 351 So. 2d 1388
(Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Kyle v. Beco Corp., 707 P.2d 378 (Idaho 1985); Tate v. Mississippi
Employment Sec. Comm'n, 407 So. 2d 109 (Miss. 1981); Couch v. North Carolina
Employment Sec. Comm'n, 366 S.E.2d 574 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
70. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 123.
71. Id. at 124. See, e.g., McDonald v. Lockwood, 424 So. 2d 356 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
72. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 124. The court distinguished Newland's situation from
that of the claimant in Sonterre. Id. In Sonterre, the claimant's new shift only required her
to report to work two hours later in the morning and leave her job two hours later in the
evening. Sonterre, 379 N.W.2d at 282.
73. Newland, 460 N.W.2d at 124.
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After making this determination, the court addressed the final
issue of whether Newland had made a good faith effort to preserve
her employment by diligently attempting to find child care.74
Because Job Service had not made any findings regarding New-
land's efforts to secure child care or of the availability of evening
child care in her community, the court reversed the trial court's
order and remanded the case to Job Service for determination of
these issues.75 The court held that if it was found that such a good
faith effort was made, benefits should be awarded.76
At the time unemployment compensation laws were adopted,
there was little need to include family-related concerns in unem-
ployment compensation legislation. The spheres of work and
home were kept separate. The typical American family consisted
of a husband, a wife, and several children. The husband brought
home the paycheck, while the wife remained at home and took
care of the children. The structure of the American family is
changing, however, and the distinctions between the home and
work have become blurred. By 1988, sixty-five percent of all mar-
ried women with children under eighteen were employed.78 For
these families, arrangements must be made for the care of the chil-
dren. Additionally, there has been a significant increase in the
number of single-parent households since 1980. In these families,
the head of the household, usually a woman, has no choice but to
work. Reliable, affordable child care becomes a necessity.
As more and more women enter the labor market, child care
is becoming one of today's most widely debated social and political
issues. 79 Awareness of the child care problem has spread dramati-
cally, as is demonstrated by the amount of proposed child care leg-
islation.80 Employers in this country, on the whole, still do not
play an active role in the care of their employee's children."1 The
74. Id. Newland argued that she was unable to find available child care after 7:00 p.m.
Id. The court distinguished this case from that in Sonterre, where the claimant did not
attempt to make new child care arrangements but rather quit when notified of the shift
change. Id.
75. Id. at 124-25.
76. Id. at 124.
77. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
78. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 242 (1989).
79. Howard V. Hayghe, Employers and Child Care: What Roles Do They Play?,
MONTHLY LABOR REV., Sept. 1988, at 38. As of 1987, 67% of all women with children
under the age of 18 were in the workforce. Susan E. Shank, Women and the Labor Market:
The Link Grows Stronger, MONTHLY LABOR REV., March 1988, at 6. In 1975, there were
13 million women with children in the job market. Handbook of Labor Statistics, supra
note 78, at 240-41. By 1988, the number exceeded 20 million. Eight million had children
under six years of age-too young to be in school during the day. Id.
80. Hayghe, supra note 79, at 38.
81. Id. As of 1987, only 11% of all companies employing 10 or more employees
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unemployment laws of most states render a worker who puts fam-
ily concerns ahead of his or her employment ineligible for unem-
ployment benefits. The decision in Newland v. Job Service North
Dakota shows a definite change in the North Dakota Supreme
Court's attitude toward this topic. The case recognizes that child
care in the United States is no longer just an employee concern
but, rather, one the employer must also consider. Thus, the result
reached in Newland may be an indication by the North Dakota
Supreme Court of a general movement to accommodate the needs
of the family within the framework of the unemployment com-
pensation system. This decision by the North Dakota Supreme
Court is proper in light of the increased role women with children
are playing in the American labor force, a factor that was not an
issue at the time unemployment compensation law was enacted.
VonetteJ Richter
reported that they provided employer-sponsored day care, financial assistance toward it, or
information and referral services to assist employees in securing child care. Id. at 39.
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